Abstract Here I explore a new line of evidence for belief–credence dualism, the thesis that beliefs and credences are distinct and equally fundamental types of mental states. Despite considerable recent disagreement over this thesis, little attention has been paid in philosophy to differences in how our mindreading systems represent the beliefs and credences of others. Fascinatingly, the systems we rely on to accurately and efficiently track others’ mental states appear to function like belief–credence dualists: Credence is tracked like an emotional state, composed of both representational and affective content, whereas belief is tracked like a bare representational state with no affective component. I argue on a preliminary basis that, in this particular case, the mechanics of mentalizing likely pick out a genuine affective dimension to credence that is absent for belief, further strengthening the converging case for belief–credence dualism.

中文翻译：

---

我听说你有信心

摘要 在这里，我探索了信念-信任二元论的新证据，即信念和信任是不同且同样基本的心理状态类型的论点。尽管最近对这一论点存在相当大的分歧，但哲学界很少关注我们的读心系统如何代表他人的信仰和信任的差异。令人着迷的是，我们赖以准确有效地跟踪他人心理状态的系统似乎像信念-信任二元论者一样发挥作用：信任像情绪状态一样被跟踪，由表征和情感内容组成，而信念像裸露的表征状态一样被追踪没有情感成分。我初步认为，在这种特殊情况下，