We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce’s pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the phenomenological map, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper’s concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding “abduction” in the literature and its relation with “analogy”.

我们提出了受皮尔士实用主义观点启发的自然科学认识论模式，强调现象学地图的作用，这将现实和我们对它的想法联系起来。该模式具有可识别的数学/逻辑结构，可以探索其一些后果。我们表明，作为实验可再现性要求的看似独立的原则和充分理由原则都被图式以及波普尔的可证伪性概念所暗示。我们首先通过与 20 世纪上半叶提出的替代模式进行比较，表明该模式在划分科学方面具有一定的力量，该模式起源于赫兹，由爱因斯坦和波普尔开发。此外，所确定的差异使我们能够专注于狭义相对论的构建，表明它使用了一种直觉的速度概念，不满足皮尔士的现实要求。虽然与这个问题相关的主要数学观察已为人所知一个多世纪，但尚未从认识论的角度对其进行研究。一个可能的原因可能是物理学中社会主导的认识论不鼓励这种工作。我们简要讨论了这项工作中提出的绑架过程的关系，并讨论了文献中关于“绑架”及其与“类比”的关系。