The ‘no-difference problem’ challenges us to explain in which way the occurrence of an aggregate effect gives us reason to act in a specific way, although our individual actions make no difference to the effect’s occurrence. When discussing this problem, philosophers usually distinguish between so-called ‘triggering cases’, where the aggregate effect in question is brought about upon reaching a precise threshold, and ‘non-triggering cases’, in which no such precise threshold exists. However, despite their relevant differences, it is widely assumed not only that both categories of cases confront us with the same moral problem, but also that this problem should be solved in the same way no matter which category we are considering. In this paper, I argue that this assumption is mistaken by showing that non-triggering cases pose very different moral problems than triggering cases unless very specific and, arguably, unlikely assumptions in neighbouring debates about causation and decision-making under indeterminacy hold.

“无差异问题”挑战我们解释聚合效应的发生以何种方式使我们有理由以特定方式行动，尽管我们的个人行为对效应的发生没有影响。在讨论这个问题时，哲学家通常区分所谓的“触发案例”和“非触发案例”，即在达到精确阈值时会产生所讨论的总体效应，而“非触发案例”则不存在这样的精确阈值。然而，尽管它们存在相关差异，但人们普遍认为，这两类案件不仅给我们带来了相同的道德问题，而且无论我们考虑哪一类案件，都应该以同样的方式解决这个问题。在本文中，