当前位置: X-MOL 学术Philosophical Studies › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity
Philosophical Studies Pub Date : 2022-06-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s11098-022-01831-4
James Openshaw, Assaf Weksler

According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. “Capacities first” (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow.

We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a perceptual capacity which picks it out. Although each eye, used on its own, can suffice for perceiving objects in one’s environment, binocular vision allows one to see the same object(s) via both eyes, taking advantage of informational disparities registered by each eye. Yet in certain conditions it is possible to simultaneously see one object via the left eye and a distinct object via the right eye (at least when the inputs are sufficiently similar to prevent the onset of binocular rivalry). We argue that capacitism has trouble making sense of this. After surveying responses, we conclude that not all of the above phenomena can be unified under the capacitist framework. We then present a more nuanced, disjunctivist account of how capacities are individuated. While it may be illuminating to think of perceiving as the employment of perceptual capacities, this picture does not best favour a ‘common factor’ theory of perceptual content in the way existing presentations have envisaged.



中文翻译:

感性电容主义:分离不统一的论据

根据电容主义,感知是运用个人层面的感知能力。在一系列出版物中,Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) 认为,电容主义提供了对感知特殊性、感知内容、感知意识、感知证据和感知知识的统一分析。“容量优先”(2020:715);一系列令人印象深刻的感性和认识论现象的引人入胜的叙述将随之而来。

我们认为,鉴于支持上述分析的 Schellenbergian 个体化感知能力的方式,感知对象不需要使用将其挑选出来的感知能力。虽然每只眼睛单独使用就足以感知一个人环境中的物体,但双眼视觉允许一个人通过双眼看到相同的物体,利用每只眼睛记录的信息差异。然而,在某些情况下,可以同时通过左眼看到一个物体,通过右眼看到一个不同的物体(至少当输入足够相似以防止双眼竞争的发生时)。我们认为,资本主义难以理解这一点。在调查回复后,我们得出结论,并非所有上述现象都可以在资本主义框架下统一起来。然后,我们对能力如何个体化提出了一个更加细致入微的析取主义解释。尽管将感知视为感知能力的运用可能是有启发性的,但这幅图并不最有利于现有演示所设想的感知内容的“共同因素”理论。

更新日期:2022-06-08
down
wechat
bug