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Technology investments into a supplier with upstream entry
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.4 ) Pub Date : 2022-06-04 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.054
Guanmei Liu , Haijun Wang , Xiaofeng Shao

This study examines the effect of the upstream entry in a supply chain, where one manufacturer (she), facing the entry of one potential supplier, makes technology investments into the incumbent supplier (he) or the entrant supplier. We first find the upstream entry may motivate the manufacturer to make more investments into the incumbent, unless the entrant has a production cost advantage over the incumbent, given a high investment cost. Our work further reveals a ‘triple win’ outcome may be achievable for all players, as not only the manufacturer but surprisingly the incumbent can receive higher profits after the upstream entry, no matter which supplier she invests in. Moreover, the manufacturer’s optional strategies of technology investee are offered in the presence of the entrant. Given a low production cost of the incumbent, the manufacturer should invest in the entrant, if the production cost ratio between the two suppliers is large and the investment cost difference between them is small, or if the ratio is very large, and the difference is small while the incumbent’s investment cost is small; and she should invest in the incumbent otherwise. Given a high production cost of the incumbent, the manufacturer should invest in the entrant, if the production cost ratio is medium (large), and meanwhile the incumbent’s investment cost, holding a small difference with the entrant’s, is large (small); and she should invest in the incumbent otherwise. Finally, one extension, where the manufacturer invests into both suppliers, is discussed.



中文翻译:

对上游进入供应商的技术投资

本研究考察了供应链上游进入的影响,其中一个制造商(她)面对一个潜在供应商的进入,对现有供应商(他)或进入供应商进行技术投资。我们首先发现上游进入可能会激励制造商对现有企业进行更多投资,除非进入者在投资成本高的情况下比现有企业具有生产成本优势。我们的工作进一步揭示了所有参与者都可能实现“三赢”的结果,因为不仅制造商,而且令人惊讶的是,老牌企业在进入上游后可以获得更高的利润,无论她投资哪个供应商。此外,制造商的可选策略技术被投资方在进入者在场的情况下提供。鉴于现有企业的低生产成本,如果两个供应商的生产成本比大,投资成本差异小,或者比例很大,差异小,而在位者的投资成本小,则制造商应该投资进入者;否则她应该投资现任者。鉴于在位者的生产成本较高,制造商应投资进入者,如果生产成本比中(大),同时在位者的投资成本与进入者相差很小,则大(小);否则她应该投资现任者。最后,讨论了制造商向两家供应商投资的一种扩展。如果两个供应商的生产成本比大,投资成本差异小,或者比例很大,差异小,而在位者的投资成本小;否则她应该投资现任者。鉴于在位者的生产成本较高,制造商应投资进入者,如果生产成本比中(大),同时在位者的投资成本与进入者相差很小,则大(小);否则她应该投资现任者。最后,讨论了制造商向两家供应商投资的一种扩展。如果两个供应商的生产成本比大,投资成本差异小,或者比例很大,差异小,而在位者的投资成本小;否则她应该投资现任者。鉴于在位者的生产成本较高,制造商应投资进入者,如果生产成本比中(大),同时在位者的投资成本与进入者相差很小,则大(小);否则她应该投资现任者。最后,讨论了制造商向两家供应商投资的一种扩展。鉴于在位者的生产成本较高,制造商应投资进入者,如果生产成本比中(大),同时在位者的投资成本与进入者相差很小,则大(小);否则她应该投资现任者。最后,讨论了制造商向两家供应商投资的一种扩展。鉴于在位者的生产成本较高,制造商应投资进入者,如果生产成本比中(大),同时在位者的投资成本与进入者相差很小,则大(小);否则她应该投资现任者。最后,讨论了制造商向两家供应商投资的一种扩展。

更新日期:2022-06-04
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