This paper analyzes firms' incentives to engage in environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in an international market under imperfect competition. We find that in the absence of environmental taxes firms do not adopt ECSR. However, the implementation of environmental taxes by governments encourages firms to adopt ECSR under local damage. Consumers, producers, and environmentalists are better off if firms decide to be environmentally responsible than if they decide not to. We also find that the decision to adopt ECSR depends on transboundary pollution. Under global damage firms engage in ECSR only if they are highly concerned about the environment. This means that the existence of transboundary pollution negatively affects the incentives of firms to be environmentally friendly. Finally, we find that when governments cooperatively determine their environmental taxes, firms engage in ECSR under both local and global damage. Thus, under global damage firms have greater incentives to be environmentally friendly when governments cooperate on environmental policies than when they do not.

本文分析了企业在不完全竞争下在国际市场上参与环境企业社会责任（ECSR）的动机。我们发现，在没有环境税的情况下，公司不会采用 ECSR。然而，政府征收环境税鼓励企业在当地受损的情况下采用 ECSR。如果公司决定对环境负责，那么消费者、生产者和环保主义者的境遇会比他们决定不负责的情况更好。我们还发现采用 ECSR 的决定取决于跨界污染。在全球损害下，企业只有在高度关注环境的情况下才会参与 ECSR。这意味着跨界污染的存在会对企业的环保动机产生负面影响。最后，我们发现，当政府合作确定其环境税时，企业会在本地和全球损害的情况下参与 ECSR。因此，在全球损害下，当政府在环境政策上进行合作时，企业比不合作时更有动力去实现环境友好。