The validity of Husserl’s early apprehension/content of apprehension schema (Auffassung/Auffassungsinhalt Schema) of intentionality has long been a subject of dispute. In the case of phantasy (Phantasie), commentators often assert that the talk of “non-intentional content,” i.e. the phantasm, is abandoned in Husserl’s mature phenomenology of phantasy, and his subsequent theory of reproductive consciousness aims precisely to replace the previous schema. Against the current dismissive stance in the literature, this paper argues for the centrality of the concept of phantasm in the phenomenology of phantasy. This is achieved in three steps. First, I argue for a functional interpretation of the schema, which maintains that it is not an empirical-genetic account of how non-intentional “sense-data” is transformed into presentations of intentional objects, but a structural exposition of the essential moments of objectifying consciousness. Second, I revisit Husserl’s theory of reproductive consciousness, arguing that in reproduction, what is reproduced is not only the noetic experience but also the hyletic substrate. Hence, the theory of reproductive consciousness, far from calling for an abandonment of the concept of phantasm, instead clarifies this concept and its function in phantasy. To fortify the point that the phantasm is crucial for the phenomenology of phantasy, I examine two features of phantasy, namely the perspectivalness of phantasized objects and the experience of my phantasy Ego being the “zero point of orientation” in phantasy, arguing that these two essential features can only be accounted for by appealing to the concept of phantasm.

胡塞尔早期的意向性理解/内容理解图式（Auffassung/Au​​ffassungsinhalt Schema）的有效性长期以来一直是争论的焦点。在幻想的情况下（Phantasie)，评论家们经常断言，胡塞尔成熟的幻想现象学抛弃了“非有意内容”即幻想的说法，而他随后的生殖意识理论正是为了取代先前的图式。针对当前文献中的轻视立场，本文主张幻想概念在幻想现象学中的中心地位。这是通过三个步骤实现的。首先，我主张对图式进行功能解释，它坚持认为它不是对非有意的“感觉数据”如何转化为有意对象的呈现的经验-遗传解释，而是对基本时刻的结构性阐述。客观化意识。其次，我重新审视胡塞尔的生殖意识理论，认为在生殖中，被复制的不仅是精神体验，而且是精神基质。因此，生殖意识理论并没有要求放弃幻想的概念，而是澄清了这个概念及其在幻想中的作用。为了加强幻想对幻想现象学至关重要这一点，我考察了幻想的两个特征，即被幻想对象的透视性和我的幻想自我的经验是幻想中的“定向零点”，认为这两者基本特征只能通过诉诸幻想的概念来解释。而是澄清了这个概念及其在幻想中的功能。为了加强幻想对幻想现象学至关重要这一点，我考察了幻想的两个特征，即被幻想对象的透视性和我的幻想自我的经验是幻想中的“定向零点”，认为这两者基本特征只能通过诉诸幻想的概念来解释。而是澄清了这个概念及其在幻想中的功能。为了加强幻想对幻想现象学至关重要这一点，我考察了幻想的两个特征，即被幻想对象的透视性和我的幻想自我的经验是幻想中的“定向零点”，认为这两者基本特征只能通过诉诸幻想的概念来解释。