ABSTRACT

On the simulation theory of memory, to remember is to imagine an event from the personal past. McCarroll has recently argued that, because it implies not only that a genuine memory need not be caused by the rememberer’s experience of the remembered event but also that the rememberer need not even have experienced that event, simulationism is unable, first, to explain infantile amnesia (the inability to remember events that occurred in one’s early childhood) and, second, to rule out certain “impossible” memories (namely, memories of events that occurred before one was born). Responding to McCarroll, this paper argues that simulationism is in fact able to explain infantile amnesia but concedes that it is unable to rule out pre-birth memories. It goes on to argue, however, that, rather than leading us to reject the theory, this should lead us to endorse a radicalized simulationism on which to remember is simply to imagine an event from the past, regardless of whether that event belongs to the personal past.

摘要

根据记忆的模拟理论，记忆就是从个人过去想象一个事件。麦卡罗尔最近认为，因为它不仅意味着真正的记忆不需要由记忆者对所记忆事件的体验引起，而且记忆者甚至不需要经历过那个事件，所以模拟主义首先无法解释婴儿失忆症。 （无法记住儿童早期发生的事件），其次，排除某些“不可能”的记忆（即对出生前发生的事件的记忆）。作为对麦卡罗尔的回应，本文认为模拟主义实际上能够解释婴儿失忆症，但承认它无法排除出生前的记忆。然而，它继续争辩说，与其导致我们拒绝该理论，个人的过去。