Conceptual engineering is sometimes presented as an alternative to conceptual analysis. But one important objection to conceptual analysis threatens to carry across: that philosophy investigates phenomena—knowledge, truth, freedom, etc.—rather than concepts of those phenomena. This poses a prima facie problem insofar as conceptual engineering targets concepts or terms rather than phenomena. Call it the ‘phenomenon objection’. I begin by examining recent discussions of the phenomenon objection by Cappelen and Scharp, rejecting their responses. I then clarify and strengthen the objection, discussing the challenge that the ‘strong phenomenon objection’ poses to conceptual engineers. Finally, I develop a new response to the strong phenomenon objection. In doing so, I motivate, articulate and defend an account of philosophy and its problems on which conceptual engineering is the appropriate method for tackling many philosophical problems—as well as, perhaps surprisingly, some problems in the sciences.

概念工程有时被提出作为概念分析的替代方案。但是，对概念分析的一个重要反对意见可能会延续下去：哲学研究现象——知识、真理、自由等——而不是那些现象的概念。就概念工程针对概念或术语而不是现象而言，这提出了一个初步的问题。称之为“现象反对”。我首先研究了 Cappelen 和 Scharp 最近对现象反对的讨论，拒绝了他们的回应。然后，我澄清并加强了反对意见，讨论了“强烈的现象反对意见”给概念工程师带来的挑战。最后，我对强烈的现象反对提出了新的回应。在这样做的过程中，我激励，