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Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy ( IF 3.629 ) Pub Date : 2022-05-16 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.106981
Seungmin Chee , Steve Matsunaga , Shan Wang

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.



中文翻译:

董事会对收益报告和预测的有效监督:来自 CFO 外部董事任命的证据

公司在会计重述后调整其董事会结构的先前证据表明,公司期望董事会有效监督公司的财务会计系统。然而,对于公司用来识别监控弱点的信号或公司为提高监控质量而指定的个人类型知之甚少。我们扩展了 Ghannam、Bujega、Matolcsy 和 Spiropolous (2019) 的证据,即公司通过调查提交重述或发布高度不准确的收益预测的公司是否任命具有 CFO 经验的个人(即,会计专家)提交给他们的审计委员会。我们发现,当公司最近重述收益并且之前的管理预测错误较高时,公司更有可能任命具有 CFO 经验的外部董事加入审计委员会。我们还发现,任命审计委员会外部董事的首席财务官之后,重述的可能性更低,管理层预测更准确。总之,我们的结果表明,公司通过任命具有 CFO 经验的外部董事来应对会计失误。因此,我们深入了解了公司用来识别会计职能监控中的弱点的信号以及公司在解决这些弱点时重视的专业知识类型。我们还发现,任命审计委员会外部董事的首席财务官之后,重述的可能性更低,管理层预测更准确。总之,我们的结果表明,公司通过任命具有 CFO 经验的外部董事来应对会计失误。因此,我们深入了解了公司用来识别会计职能监控中的弱点的信号以及公司在解决这些弱点时重视的专业知识类型。我们还发现,任命审计委员会外部董事的首席财务官之后,重述的可能性更低,管理层预测更准确。总之,我们的结果表明,公司通过任命具有 CFO 经验的外部董事来应对会计失误。因此,我们深入了解了公司用来识别会计职能监控中的弱点的信号以及公司在解决这些弱点时重视的专业知识类型。

更新日期:2022-05-16
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