ABSTRACT

This study examined how managerial discretion “stranglehold” influences enterprise investment efficiency (IE) using a heterogeneous stochastic frontier model of 2010–2019 data of listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets. CEO’s salary and stockholding can improve IE, but cannot reduce investment risk (IR). CEO duality and redundant resources neither improve IE nor reduce IR. Organizational inertia can reduce IR but not IE. Capital intensity increases IR whereas environmental richness reduces it; both cannot improve IE. Constrained managerial discretion brings investment expenditures to 15–25% below optimal. Relatively, large, non-state-owned, and manufacturing enterprises have higher IE and lower IR.

摘要

本研究使用上海和深圳 A 股市场上市公司 2010-2019 年数据的异质随机前沿模型，研究了管理自由裁量权“束缚”如何影响企业投资效率 (IE)。CEO的薪酬和持股可以提高IE，但不能降低投资风险（IR）。CEO 双重性和冗余资源既不能提高 IE，也不能降低 IR。组织惯性可以降低 IR 但不能降低 IE。资本密集度增加了IR，而环境丰富度降低了IR；两者都不能提高IE。受限的管理自由裁量权使投资支出低于最佳水平 15-25%。相对而言，大型、非国有、制造企业的IE较高，IR较低。