Margolis’ philosophical thought and career is framed by the pragmatism that dominated his early education and his vision of a “resurgent” pragmatism as the most promising direction for an increasingly eclectic Western philosophical tradition. This version of pragmatism is based on Peirce’s formulation of the pragmatic maxim, but Margolis sees the implications of that maxim as running counter to a central strand of Peirce’s own thought: fallibilism as an infinitist, self-correcting process of inquiry asymptotically tending toward to truth and reality. Margolis argues that this version of fallibilism is untenable and un-pragmatic, and his most mature work on the subject identifies an “abductive turn” in Peirce’s philosophy which points in the direction of an improved pragmatism, a pragmatism that is anarchic, relativistic, cast in terms of tolerances instead of laws, and without “Hope” in Peirce’s sense.

中文翻译：

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马戈利斯对皮尔斯（和实用主义）的不满之处

马戈利斯的哲学思想和职业生涯受到主导他早期教育的实用主义的影响，以及他将“复兴”实用主义视为日益折衷的西方哲学传统最有希望的方向的愿景。这种实用主义的版本是基于皮尔士对实用格言的表述，但马戈利斯认为该格言的含义与皮尔士自己思想的中心思想背道而驰：易错论是一种无限主义的、自我纠正的探究过程，渐进地趋向于真理和现实。Margolis 认为，这种易错论是站不住脚的，也是不实用的，他关于这个主题的最成熟的工作确定了皮尔士哲学中的“溯因转向”，它指向改进的实用主义的方向，一种无政府、相对主义的实用主义，