Between the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, a radical reform of Banca d’Italia – the Italian central bank and banking supervisory authority – was enacted. It was the last chapter of an historical evolution, started in 1893 with its incorporation as a joint-stock-corporation under private law, whose result places the Italian system within the niche of countries that entail the participation of private investors to the ownership and governance of central banks. This article analyzes the relevant Italian regulation also by comparing it with other international experiences. While most of the debate on central banking independence focuses on independence from politics, this article explores another side of the problem, namely the risk of capture by the banking sector and of subsequent conflicts of interests.Said risk significantly increases when the central bank’s shareholders are private investors which elect some of its governing bodies and receive dividends out of its earnings. Since a central bank carries out monetary operations that generate seigniorage, the distribution of profits out of these earnings is a transfer of public value to the private sector. Such circumstances can create incentives for the owners to influence the central bank’s decisions, also according to the magnitude of the values at stake.

中文翻译：

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中央银行的所有权和治理：来自意大利经验的见解

2013 年底至 2014 年初，意大利中央银行和银行监管机构 Banca d'Italia 进行了彻底改革。这是历史演变的最后一章，始于 1893 年，根据私法成立为股份公司，其结果将意大利体系置于需要私人投资者参与所有权和治理的国家的利基市场的中央银行。本文还通过与其他国际经验的比较，分析了意大利的相关法规。虽然关于中央银行独立性的大部分辩论都集中在独立于政治上，但本文探讨了问题的另一面，即被银行业俘获的风险以及随后的利益冲突。当中央银行的股东是私人投资者，他们选择了一些管理机构并从其收益中获得股息时，上述风险会显着增加。由于中央银行进行产生铸币税的货币操作，从这些收入中分配利润是公共价值向私营部门的转移。这种情况可以激励所有者影响中央银行的决策，也取决于所涉价值的大小。