The mandatory takeover bid has been broadly investigated in the literature. The economics of such control acquisition and the pros and cons of the mandatory bid rule are nowadays well-established. Uncertainty still reigns with respect to the fundamental question whether private law remedies are available to minority shareholders in the case of a breach of the duty to make a takeover bid. Statutory law across Member States is essentially silent on this matter, and at a supranational level the CJEU’s case law does not offer valid precedents. European policymakers rely on public enforcement mechanisms, while an action for damages against the bidder is not made available or only reluctantly accepted by the courts. Italy is an outlier, allowing today – after the consolidation of the principles expressed in the leading case Fondiaria-SAI – the recourse to private enforcement remedies. This article shows that, for the purpose of good functioning and competitiveness of capital markets, private enforcement plays an important role against violations of the mandatory bid rules. Thus, public enforcement, which often proved to be ineffective or bypassed especially in cases of acting in concert, should be complemented by the recognition of civil liability of the bidder for breach of the duty to launch a takeover bid. Furthermore, the legal regime of such liability is outlined, thereby investigating the (contractual or tortious) nature of the bidder’s liability and the operativeness of such a regime (e. g., amount of damages, application of compensatio lucro cum damno rule).

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违反强制投标规则：公共与私人执法辩论中的少数股东保护

强制收购要约已在文献中进行了广泛研究。这种控制权收购的经济性以及强制投标规则的利弊如今已得到公认。在违反提出收购要约的义务的情况下，小股东是否可以使用私法救济这一基本问题仍然存在不确定性。各成员国的成文法在此问题上基本上保持沉默，在超国家层面上，欧洲法院的判例法并未提供有效的先例。欧洲政策制定者依赖公共执法机制，而对投标人的损害赔偿诉讼无法获得或只能被法院勉强接受。意大利是个异类，在巩固了主要案例 Fondiaria-SAI 中表达的原则之后，今天允许诉诸私人执法补救措施。本文表明，为了资本市场的良好运作和竞争力，私人执法在打击违反强制性投标规则的行为中发挥着重要作用。因此，公共执法通常被证明无效或被绕过，尤其是在一致行动的情况下，应通过承认投标人违反发起收购要约义务的民事责任来补充。此外，概述了这种责任的法律制度，从而调查投标人责任的（合同或侵权）性质和这种制度的可操作性（例如，损害赔偿金额、适用 本文表明，为了资本市场的良好运作和竞争力，私人执法在打击违反强制性投标规则的行为中发挥着重要作用。因此，公共执法通常被证明无效或被绕过，尤其是在一致行动的情况下，应通过承认投标人违反发起收购要约义务的民事责任来补充。此外，概述了这种责任的法律制度，从而调查投标人责任的（合同或侵权）性质和这种制度的可操作性（例如，损害赔偿金额、适用 本文表明，为了资本市场的良好运作和竞争力，私人执法在打击违反强制性投标规则的行为中发挥着重要作用。因此，公共执法通常被证明无效或被绕过，尤其是在一致行动的情况下，应通过承认投标人违反发起收购要约义务的民事责任来补充。此外，概述了这种责任的法律制度，从而调查投标人责任的（合同或侵权）性质和这种制度的可操作性（例如，损害赔偿金额、适用 公共执法通常被证明是无效的或被绕过，尤其是在一致行动的情况下，应辅之以承认投标人违反发起收购要约的义务的民事责任。此外，概述了这种责任的法律制度，从而调查投标人责任的（合同或侵权）性质和这种制度的可操作性（例如，损害赔偿金额、适用 公共执法通常被证明是无效的或被绕过，尤其是在一致行动的情况下，应辅之以承认投标人违反发起收购要约的义务的民事责任。此外，概述了这种责任的法律制度，从而调查投标人责任的（合同或侵权）性质和这种制度的可操作性（例如，损害赔偿金额、适用补偿 卢克罗 暨 该死规则）。