Much ado has been made about the specter of unconventional weapons in the hands of militant groups. Despite the alarmism of the policy community, the pursuit of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities by non-state actors is rare. What explains why some violent non-state organizations pursue chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons while most do not? Using new data on organizational behaviors and attributes from the Big Allied and Dangerous 2 Insurgency project, we analyze 140 insurgent actors, from 1998 to 2012. We expand previous work by Asal, Ackerman & Rethemeyer by studying the phenomenon longitudinally and attending to organizational behavior rather than only to structural and environmental factors. We find that organizations that attack cultural sites are more likely to pursue and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. We interpret the latter as a willingness to transgress upon accepted mores, for the sake of sensationalism and shock value, which coheres with a willingness to pursue unconventional weapons. Our results reflect that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear pursuit and use is part of a larger strategy for some violent non-state organizations, one predicated on generating mass fear and exacting a psychological toll.

中文翻译：

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打破禁忌：为什么叛乱分子追求和使用 CBRN 武器

关于武装组织手中的非常规武器的幽灵已经引起了很多争论。尽管政策界危言耸听，但非国家行为者追求化学、生物、放射和核能力的情况很少见。什么解释了为什么一些暴力的非国家组织追求化学、生物、放射性和核武器，而大多数不追求？使用来自 Big Allied and Dangerous 2 Insurgency 项目的有关组织行为和属性的新数据，我们分析了 1998 年至 2012 年的 140 名叛乱分子。我们通过纵向研究这一现象并关注组织行为而不是关注组织行为来扩展 Asal、Ackerman 和 Rethemeyer 之前的工作不仅仅是结构和环境因素。我们发现攻击文化遗址的组织更有可能追求和使用化学物质，生物、放射性和核武器。我们将后者解释为为了耸人听闻和震撼价值而违背公认的道德规范的意愿，这与追求非常规武器的意愿相一致。我们的研究结果表明，化学、生物、放射和核的追捕和使用是某些暴力非国家组织更大战略的一部分，该战略的前提是产生大规模恐惧并造成心理损失。