Normative powers like promising allow agents to effect changes to their reasons, permissions and rights by the means of communicative actions whose function is to effect just those changes. An attractive view of the normativity of such powers combines a non-reductive account of their bindingness with a value-based grounding story of why we have them. This value-based view of normative powers however invites a charge of wishful thinking: Is it not bad reasoning to think that we have a given power because it would be good? In this article, I offer a defence of the value-based view of normative powers against this surprisingly under-discussed objection. First, I clarify the challenge by distinguishing between two components of normative powers, which I call the material and normative components, respectively. Secondly, I defend the form of normative explanation involved, showing that it is needed to give convincing value-based explanations for other important normative phenomena, especially rights of autonomy.

像许诺这样的规范性权力允许代理人通过交流行为来改变他们的理由、许可和权利，其功能就是实现这些改变。对这些权力的规范性的一个有吸引力的观点结合了对它们的约束性的非还原性说明与一个基于价值的基础故事，即我们为什么拥有它们。然而，这种基于价值的规范性权力观点引发了一种一厢情愿的指控：认为我们拥有某种特定权力是因为它是好的，这难道不是一个糟糕的推理吗？在这篇文章中，我为规范权力的基于价值的观点辩护，反对这种令人惊讶的未充分讨论的反对意见。首先，我通过区分规范权力的两个组成部分来阐明挑战，我分别称之为物质组成部分和规范组成部分。第二，