[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 123(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2023-02979-002). In the article, the affiliation information for Alixandra Barasch and Deborah A. Small has been updated and now appears in the author note. All versions of this article have been corrected.] The widespread demand for luxury is best understood by the social advantages of signaling status (i.e., conspicuous consumption; Veblen, 1899). In the present research, we examine the limits of this perspective by studying the implications of status signaling for cooperation. Cooperation is principally about caring for others, which is fundamentally at odds with the self-promotional nature of signaling status. Across behaviorally consequential Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games and naturalistic scenario studies, we investigate both sides of the relationship between signaling and cooperation: (a) how people respond to others who signal status, as well as (b) the strategic choices people make about whether to signal status. In each case, we find that people recognize the relative advantage of modesty (i.e., the inverse of signaling status) and behave strategically to enable cooperation. That is, people are less likely to cooperate with partners who signal status compared to those who are modest (Studies 1 and 2), and more likely to select a modest person when cooperation is desirable (Study 3). These behaviors are consistent with inferences that status signalers are less prosocial and less prone to cooperate. Importantly, people also refrain from signaling status themselves when it is strategically beneficial to appear cooperative (Studies 4-6). Together, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which the reputational costs of conspicuous consumption outweigh its benefits, helping integrate theoretical perspectives on strategic interpersonal dynamics, cooperation, and status signaling. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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关于谦虚的价值：地位信号如何破坏合作。

[更正通知：本文的勘误发表于《人格与社会心理学杂志》第 123(4) 卷（见记录 2023-02979-002）。在文章中，Alixandra Barasch 和 Deborah A. Small 的隶属关系信息已更新，现在出现在作者注释中。本文的所有版本均已更正。] 对奢侈品的广泛需求最好通过信号地位的社会优势来理解（即炫耀性消费；Veblen，1899）。在本研究中，我们通过研究状态信号对合作的影响来检验这种观点的局限性。合作主要是关爱他人，这与信号状态的自我推销性质根本不一致。在行为后果囚徒困境 (PD) 游戏和自然主义情景研究中，我们研究了信号与合作之间关系的双方：（a）人们如何回应其他发出状态信号的人，以及（b）人们对是否发出状态信号做出的战略选择。在每种情况下，我们发现人们认识到谦虚的相对优势（即与信号状态相反）并采取策略性行为以实现合作。也就是说，与谦虚的人相比，人们不太可能与表明身份的伴侣合作（研究 1 和 2），并且在需要合作时更有可能选择谦虚的人（研究 3）。这些行为与地位信号者不太亲社会和不太倾向于合作的推论是一致的。重要的是，当表现出合作具有战略意义时，人们也会避免自己发出状态信号（研究 4-6）。一起，我们的研究结果有助于更好地理解炫耀性消费的声誉成本超过其收益的条件，有助于整合关于战略人际关系动态、合作和地位信号的理论观点。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2022 APA，保留所有权利）。