Epistemic constitutivism (EC ) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what's special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons.

中文翻译：

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为关于认知规范性的构成主义辩护

认知构成主义（EC  ）认为，信仰的本质是它产生了正确性标准，并且其他认知规范性概念（例如，信仰的理由）可以根据该标准来解释。如果站得住脚，这种观点承诺了对认知规范性的一个有吸引力和统一的解释。然而，EC面临一个强烈的反对意见：正确性的构成标准永远不足以产生规范性理由。面对这一反对意见，本文旨在为EC辩护。我分两步这样做。首先，我对针对EC案的一个关键假设提出异议：一般正确性的构成标准是“给出理由的”，只有当并且因为还有一个遵守它们的事先理由。其次，我概述了EC如何应对挑战的策略，即解释相信活动的特殊之处，以便与其他标准管理的活动不同，它能够产生规范性理由。