In 1917–18, the new republican governments of Russia, Germany, and Austria nationalized their former court property. A monarchic-turned-national heritage of prestigious opera and dramatic theatres weighed heavily on national and regional budgets, prompting first attempts to create centralized forms of theatre governance. In a second wave of theatre reorganization in the mid-1930s, the Soviet government created ‘union theatres’ under a Committee for Arts Affairs; the German and Austrian theatres underwent the Nazi Gleichschaltung (1933–35 and 1938); and France, a ‘democratic outlier’, opted for nationalizing the Opéra and Opéra-Comique under the Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationaux. These conglomerates have so far been little studied as historically specific forms of theatre management, particularly from a comparative, trans-regime perspective. What balance can be struck between economic, political, and ‘artistic’ costs and benefits? How does ‘Baumol’s law’ of decreasing theatre profitability apply to these very different politico-economic systems, as well as to war economies? Dictatorships reveal an economic seduction power, while this essay argues for confirming a long-term ‘great European convergence’ of state-centred theatre management, internal structure, and accountability, both in peace and war. Here, the stated goals and short-term contingencies yielded to trends originating from the logic of theatre production itself, and the compromises that the state, theatre professionals, and the public accepted in exchange for the capital of prestige. Alexander Golovlev (PhD, European University Institute in Florence, 2017) is a senior research fellow at the HSE Institute for Advanced Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at the University of Moscow. His recent publications include, for New Theatre Quarterly, ‘Theatre Policies of Soviet Stalinism and Italian Fascism Compared, 1920–1940s’ (2019), and ‘Balancing the Books and Staging Operas under Duress: Bolshoi Theatre Management, Wartime Economy, and State Sponsorship in 1941–1945’, Russian History XLVII, No. 4 (2020).

1917-18 年，俄罗斯、德国和奥地利的新共和政府将他们以前的宫廷财产国有化。享有盛誉的歌剧和戏剧剧院由君主制转变为国家遗产，严重影响了国家和地区的预算，促使人们首次尝试建立集中式的剧院治理形式。在 1930 年代中期的第二次剧院重组浪潮中，苏联政府在艺术事务委员会下创建了“联合剧院”；德国和奥地利的剧院经历了纳粹Gleichschaltung（1933-35 和 1938 年）；而法国，一个“民主异类”，选择在 Réunion des théâtres lyriques nationalaux 下将歌剧院和喜剧歌剧院国有化。迄今为止，很少有人将这些企业集团作为历史上特定的剧院管理形式进行研究，特别是从比较、跨政权的角度来看。在经济、政治和“艺术”成本和收益之间可以取得怎样的平衡？降低战区盈利能力的“鲍莫尔定律”如何适用于这些截然不同的政治经济体系以及战时经济？独裁政权揭示了一种经济诱惑力，而本文主张确认以国家为中心的剧院管理、内部结构和问责制在和平与战争中的长期“欧洲大融合”。这里，既定目标和短期突发事件屈服于源自戏剧制作本身逻辑的趋势，以及国家、戏剧专业人士和公众为换取声望资本而接受的妥协。Alexander Golovlev（博士，佛罗伦萨欧洲大学研究所，2017 年）是莫斯科大学 HSE 高级苏联和后苏联研究所高级研究员。他最近的出版物包括新剧院季刊，“苏联斯大林主义和意大利法西斯主义的戏剧政策比较，1920-1940 年代”（2019 年）和“在胁迫下平衡书籍和上演歌剧：莫斯科大剧院管理、战时经济和 1941-1945 年的国家赞助”，俄罗斯历史XLVII，第 4 期（2020 年）。