Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects’ decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.

证明在意志行为之前与决策相关的神经活动的发现主导了关于科学如何为自由意志辩论提供信息的讨论。这些讨论在很大程度上忽略了研究表明决策可能受到各种无意识过程的影响或偏见。如果这些影响确实是真实的，它们是否会使受试者的决定不那么自由甚至不自由？在这里，我们认为，虽然对决策的无意识影响一般不会威胁自由意志的存在，但它们提供了有关特定情况下自由限制的重要信息。我们证明了这一长期争论的各个方面是可以通过经验检验的，并提供了对它们对自由度的影响的洞察，为未来的科学哲学方法奠定了基础。