A controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) which did not limit the use of state's eminent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as one of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state's predation was greater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politicians by both the Supreme Court and the state's legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions, judicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous statistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo. The main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly expected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too Kelo, not by changing the law, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper finds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a taking for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even when both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to an alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and that officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their exercise of power.

中文翻译：

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政府是否用尽了权力？Kelo 前后纽约市征用权活动的实证检验

美国最高法院在Kelo 诉新伦敦市案中有争议的裁决(2005) 没有限制国家征用权的使用，导致几乎所有 50 个州都做出了前所未有的立法反应。其中，纽约州脱颖而出，成为未通过立法修正案回应的单一州之一。在这项研究中，我问在这些法律和政治发展之后的几年里，鉴于最高法院和州立法者授予地方政客的自由，州的掠夺是否更大。文章假设，与普遍看法相反，即使没有对权力的使用施加限制，司法判决也会影响地方政府的行为。我使用严格的统计数据和严格定义的数据来扩展对 Kelo 司法判决后果的学术理解。Kelo，不是通过改变法律，而是通过改变他们的做法。该论文研究了 1991 年至 2019 年间纽约市所有已知的征税活动，发现 2005 年之后涉及征税的开发项目数量没有增加。事实上，为经济发展或城市更新征税的可能性下降了 90%。即使州和联邦法院都没有对其使用施加任何实际限制，此类项目对征用权的使用也在减少。该文件对另一种说法提供了有条件的支持，即政府官员的决策主要由计划和政治需要决定，并且即使没有宪法或法律阻碍他们行使权力，官员对公开的公众偏好也很敏感。