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Insights into auditor public oversight boards: Whether, how, and why they “work”
Journal of Accounting and Economics ( IF 7.293 ) Pub Date : 2022-04-11 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101497
Michelle Hanlon 1 , Nemit Shroff 1
Affiliation  

We survey 170 inspectors, representing 27% of the inspection staff, from auditor public oversight boards (POBs) in 20 countries to understand whether, how, and why auditors respond to POB oversight. We find that a large majority of inspectors believe that auditors frequently respond to their feedback by changing audit procedures and quality control systems. Inspectors perceive inspections to have broad effects on several aspects of auditing, ranging from documentation to the removal of partners. Some inspectors perceive that auditors place greater weight on keeping fees low than on increasing audit quality. Inspectors also believe that auditors on occasion ‘fix’ closed audit files before an inspection, and in rare instances obtain confidential information about upcoming inspections. Inspectors think that the primary reasons why auditors respond to POB feedback are (1) public disclosure, (2) enforcement capabilities, (3) POBs being perceived as authoritative, and (4) POBs having a culture for detecting auditing deficiencies.



中文翻译:

洞察审计公共监督委员会:它们是否、如何以及为什么“工作”

我们对来自 20 个国家/地区的审计公共监督委员会 (POB) 的 170 名检查员(占检查人员的 27%)进行了调查,以了解审计员是否、如何以及为何应对公共监督委员会的监督。我们发现,绝大多数检查员认为审计师经常通过改变审计程序和质量控制系统来回应他们的反馈。检查员认为检查对审计的多个方面产生广泛影响,从记录文件到解除合作伙伴。一些检查员认为,与提高审计质量相比,审计师更重视保持低收费。检查员还认为,审核员有时会在检查前“修复”已关闭的审核文件,并且在极少数情况下会获得有关即将进行的检查的机密信息。

更新日期:2022-04-11
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