Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. commodity futures exchanges have increasingly been the focus of tight government regulation, which resulted in strong control by a specific agency: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. In Europe, the regulation of futures diverged from the U.S. model. No regulation at the communitarian level was implemented; at the national level, the United Kingdom emerged as a model of self-regulation of commodity markets. This article explores the historical causes behind this lack of regulation in Europe, placing it in the context of global commodity trading and arguing that the European regulation of futures trading was reshaped by a dialogue established between the European Commission and big players of commodity futures trading in the City of London. Since the mid-1960s, the City of London has become a pivotal global market venue for commodity futures, which has increasingly attracted players from abroad, thanks to its financial integrity and self-regulatory model. Both established London merchants and emerging players in the global trade of financial products cooperated to stave off any attempt at regulating the London futures exchanges. The inference here is that those attempts were instrumental in setting the conditions leading to the regulatory fragmentation that still characterizes futures trading in the global market.

自20世纪70年代中期以来，美国商品期货交易所日益成为政府严格监管的焦点，这导致了一个特定机构的强力控制：商品期货交易委员会。在欧洲，期货监管与美国模式不同。没有实施社区层面的监管；在国家一级，联合王国成为商品市场自我监管的典范。本文探讨了欧洲缺乏监管背后的历史原因，并将其置于全球大宗商品交易的背景下，并认为欧洲对期货交易的监管是通过欧盟委员会与大宗商品期货交易参与者之间建立的对话而重塑的。伦敦金融城。自 20 世纪 60 年代中期以来，伦敦金融城已成为全球商品期货的重要市场场所，凭借其金融诚信和自律监管模式，越来越多地吸引海外参与者。伦敦的老牌商人和全球金融产品贸易中的新兴参与者合作，阻止任何监管伦敦期货交易所的企图。这里的推论是，这些尝试有助于创造导致监管分散的条件，而监管分散仍然是全球市场期货交易的特征。伦敦的老牌商人和全球金融产品贸易中的新兴参与者合作，阻止任何监管伦敦期货交易所的企图。这里的推论是，这些尝试有助于创造导致监管分散的条件，而监管分散仍然是全球市场期货交易的特征。伦敦的老牌商人和全球金融产品贸易中的新兴参与者合作，阻止任何监管伦敦期货交易所的企图。这里的推论是，这些尝试有助于创造导致监管分散的条件，而监管分散仍然是全球市场期货交易的特征。