Judicially supervised negotiated settlements have featured heavily of late in discourse on responses to financial crimes committed by corporations. The United States has recently concluded a series of proceeds of kleptocracy settlements with individuals using processes which, from transparency and accountability perspectives, compare favourably to England’s asset recovery practice. This paper seeks to foster a conversation on whether the use of negotiated responses could or should be extended to arrangements with natural persons who are suspected of laundering the proceeds of grand corruption in England. It addresses some reservations that arise where negotiated responses to official corruption are employed and seeks to identify principled and practical justifications for the use of settlements instead of public civil recovery proceedings. It also draws on the US and English experiences in entering into settlements with companies for bribery offences in attempting to identify some of the main pitfalls and benefits implicit in utilising negotiated responses to corruption. The paper concludes by tentatively endorsing as an imperfect but pragmatic option the use of settlements as an alternative to existing asset recovery measures for corruptly-acquired assets.

司法监督的谈判解决方案最近在关于应对公司金融犯罪的讨论中占有重要地位。美国最近与个人达成了一系列盗窃统治和解的收益，这些个人使用的流程从透明度和问责制的角度来看，与英国的资产追回做法相比是有利的。本文旨在促进就谈判回应的使用是否可以或应该扩展到与涉嫌在英格兰洗钱的自然人的安排进行对话。它解决了在采用谈判应对官员腐败时出现的一些保留意见，并试图确定使用和解而不是公共民事追偿程序的原则和实际理由。它还借鉴了美国和英国与公司就贿赂犯罪达成和解的经验，试图找出利用谈判应对腐败所隐含的一些主要缺陷和好处。本文最后暂时赞同使用和解作为现有资产追回措施的替代方案，以替代腐败获得的资产，这是一种不完美但务实的选择。