We present a model of the interaction between firms agreeing on a degree of collusion and a competition authority that simultaneously determines the allocation of resources to enforcement of anti-trust legislation. An increase in demand is associated with tougher enforcement and a lower degree of collusion. A stronger competitive pressure first decreases the degree of collusion and increases the level of enforcement, then increases both the degree of collusion and the level of enforcement, and eventually increases the degree of collusion and decreases the level of enforcement. Simulation results indicate that a move from the EU penalty regime to the tougher US standard with treble damages would mainly impact on the enforcement intensity and to a much lesser extent affect the degree of collusion.

我们提出了一个在一定程度的共谋上达成一致的公司与竞争主管机构之间的互动模型，竞争主管机构同时决定了为执行反垄断立法而分配的资源。需求的增加与更严厉的执法和较低程度的勾结有关。更强的竞争压力首先会降低共谋程度，提高执法水平，然后会提高共谋程度和执法水平，最终会提高共谋程度，降低执法水平。模拟结果表明，从欧盟处罚制度向更严厉的美国标准的三倍损害赔偿将主要影响执法强度，而在较小程度上影响共谋程度。