One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight” or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our rational acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky though we still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright's proposal is the so-called Leaching Worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence-based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Epistemic Entitlement theorist two distinct responses.

中文翻译：

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认知权利、认知风险和浸出

对怀疑论悖论的一种论证是通过证明某种形而上学上的“重量级”或“基石”命题超出所有可能的证据范围，因此可能不为人所知或无法合理相信。克里斯平·赖特 (Crispin Wright) 争辩说，我们可以承认，我们对这些命题的理性接受显然是有风险的，尽管我们仍然理性地有权获得那些看似受到让步威胁的我们常识的主张。赖特提议的一个问题是所谓的浸出式担忧：如果我们仅在没有证据的情况下理性地有权接受基石，我们如何才能对我们认为自己知道的大量日常命题获得基于证据的知识，这些命题需要基石是真实的？本文提出了一个严谨的，