Soon it may be possible to promote the rehabilitation of criminal offenders through neurointerventions (interventions which exert direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain). Some jurisdictions already utilise neurointerventions to diminish the risk of sexual or drug-related reoffending. And investigation is underway into several other neurointerventions that might also have rehabilitative applications within criminal justice—for example, pharmacotherapy to reduce aggression or impulsivity. Ethical debate on the use of neurointerventions to facilitate rehabilitation—henceforth ‘neurorehabilitation’—has proceeded on two assumptions: that we have instrumental reasons for employing neurorehabilitation (e.g. because it helps protect the public from crime); and that its permissibility depends upon whether its use unjustifiably infringes offenders’ rights. This paper defends a different, hitherto neglected thought. I argue we have rights-based reasons to offer neurorehabilitation to offenders—in other words, that offenders have a moral right to neurorehabilitation. I identify three considerations which support a moral right to conventional rehabilitative interventions—(1) as a countermeasure to the debilitating side-effects of punishment; (2) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; and (3) as compensation for structural injustice. I argue these considerations extend to support a moral right to neurorehabilitation in the following instance: when neurorehabilitation would be part of the most effective package for facilitating rehabilitation, and can be carried out at reasonable cost. I then defend my argument against potential objections, including the objection that neurorehabilitation is a bad option for offenders to have and the charge of over-medicalisation.

很快就有可能通过神经干预（对大脑产生直接物理、化学或生物影响的干预措施）来促进犯罪分子的康复。一些司法管辖区已经利用神经干预措施来降低性犯罪或与毒品相关的再犯罪风险。目前正在对其他几种神经干预措施进行调查，这些干预措施也可能在刑事司法领域的康复应用中发挥作用，例如减少攻击性或冲动的药物疗法。关于使用神经干预措施促进康复（以下称为“神经康复”）的伦理辩论基于两个假设：我们有采用神经康复的重要理由（例如，因为它有助于保护公众免受犯罪侵害）；其允许性取决于其使用是否不合理地侵犯了犯罪者的权利。本文捍卫了一种不同的、迄今为止被忽视的想法。我认为我们有基于权利的理由向罪犯提供神经康复——换句话说，罪犯拥有接受神经康复的道德权利。我提出了三个支持传统康复干预的道德权利的考虑因素：（1）作为惩罚令人衰弱的副作用的对策；(2) 作为希望重获自由的权利的衍生权利；(3) 作为结构性不公正的补偿。我认为，在以下情况下，这些考虑因素可以延伸到支持神经康复的道德权利：当神经康复将成为促进康复的最有效一揽子计划的一部分，并且可以以合理的成本进行时。然后，我针对潜在的反对意见为我的论点进行辩护，包括认为神经康复对于罪犯来说是一个糟糕的选择以及过度医疗化的指控。