A long-standing debate amongst international relations scholars has surrounded the question of whether international institutions with judicial authority enjoy more autonomy and discretion than other global institutions. This is mainly because international courts are established as impartial third-party actors tasked with performing adjudicative functions for conflicting parties. As such, the delegation contracts of international institutions with judicial authority are expected to minimize control by states, even in cases where the members of a court engage in judicial overreach. This article contributes to that debate by examining the case of the crisis of the WTO Appellate Body. The article analyzes the Trump administration's successful efforts at rendering dysfunctional one of the most powerful courts in the international system. The findings showcase how powerful states are capable and willing to take advantage of the available control mechanisms and the institutional opportunity structures inherent in the design of international courts. The article speaks to the scholarship on the contestation of international institutions. The analysis relies on original data obtained through 22 interviews with WTO officials, state representatives, and experts.

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你被开除了！特朗普总统任期内的国际法院、再合同和世贸组织上诉机构

国际关系学者长期以来一直争论的问题是，拥有司法权威的国际机构是否比其他全球机构享有更多的自主权和自由裁量权。这主要是因为国际法院是作为公正的第三方行为者设立的，其任务是为冲突各方履行裁决职能。因此，具有司法权力的国际机构的授权合同预计会最大限度地减少国家的控制，即使在法院成员超越司法权的情况下也是如此。本文通过考察世贸组织上诉机构的危机案例，为这场辩论做出了贡献。文章分析了特朗普政府在使国际体系中最强大的法院之一瘫痪方面所做的成功努力。研究结果展示了强国如何有能力并愿意利用现有的控制机制和国际法院设计中固有的制度机会结构。文章谈到了国际机构奖学金的争夺。该分析基于对 WTO 官员、国家代表和专家进行 22 次采访获得的原始数据。