Most studies in collaborative governance examine system-level or agency-level drivers of the horizontal dimension of collaboration, i.e., the specific forms of collaboration among an existing set of actors. Few have examined the vertical dimension, i.e., what actors are involved and the scope of collaboration. This study examines the latter issue by studying the implementation of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA), passed in 2014, mandating collaboration among local agencies. We theorize that when their core mission and key constituencies’ interests are at stake under a mandate, agencies focus on protecting organizational autonomy and bureaucratic turf in determining the scope of the collaborative arrangement, rendering other usual collaboration drivers less relevant. With data derived from administrative records and a statewide survey of local groundwater managers, we test this argument using several analytical methods, including probit regression, two-step estimation of an ordered-probit selection model, and a linear probability model. The analyses consistently show that agencies are more likely to commit to regionally integrated collaboration that matches the scale of a groundwater basin if (1) their mission addresses a broader issue focus (lower issue specificity), (2) their core stakeholder groups have less concentrated interests, and (3) the organizational culture is less rigid and risk averse. In contrast, other well-known horizontal collaboration drivers do not matter. By unpacking the agency-specific sources of turf and reputation protection, this study contributes to an understanding of collaboration risk management.

中文翻译：

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当代理优先事项很重要时：强制协作中自治和草皮保护的风险规避

大多数协作治理研究考察了协作水平维度的系统级或机构级驱动因素，即现有参与者之间协作的特定形式。很少有人研究纵向维度，即涉及哪些参与者和合作范围。本研究通过研究 2014 年通过的加州可持续地下水管理法案 (SGMA) 的实施情况来检验后一个问题，该法案要求地方机构之间进行合作。我们的理论认为，当他们的核心使命和关键支持者的利益在一项任务下受到威胁时，机构在确定合作安排的范围时会专注于保护组织自主权和官僚地盘，从而降低其他通常的合作驱动因素的相关性。利用从行政记录和对当地地下水管理者的全州调查得出的数据，我们使用几种分析方法检验了这一论点，包括概率回归、有序概率选择模型的两步估计和线性概率模型。分析一致表明，如果（1）他们的任务解决更广泛的问题焦点（较低的问题特异性），（2）他们的核心利益相关者群体的集中度较低，这些机构更有可能致力于与地下水盆地规模相匹配的区域综合合作(3) 组织文化不那么僵化和规避风险。相比之下，其他著名的横向协作驱动因素则无关紧要。通过解开特定机构的地盘和声誉保护来源，