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When do natural disasters lead to negotiations in a civil war?
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH ( IF 3.713 ) Pub Date : 2022-03-06 , DOI: 10.1177/00223433211061952
Stephen Nemeth 1 , Brian Lai 2
Affiliation  

The effect of natural disasters on the end of civil wars has received little attention from scholars. We argue that the effect of disasters on conflict negotiation is dependent on which combatant is victimized by disaster. Drawing on a bargaining model, we argue that disasters create costs that alter the capabilities of the rebels and government. In order for these changes to lead to negotiations, the effects of a disaster have to lead to the mutual expectation that military victory is unlikely in the short term. When both sides are hit by a natural disaster, this mutual expectation is likely to form because both sides face significant costs to engaging in conflict in the short term. When one side is impacted, the non-affected side is likely to see an opportunity to gain against its rival while the side facing the devastation of a natural disaster may see only a temporary setback that it can recover from. This may lead both sides to not update their beliefs about the costs of war, or their chances of victory. We evaluate these hypotheses by examining all territorial civil wars from 1980 to 2005 using a more precise measure of disaster location. We find that when both sides are hit by a disaster, the likelihood of negotiation consistently increases. When only one side is impacted, the effect on negotiations is not consistent across model specifications.



中文翻译:

自然灾害何时会导致内战谈判?

自然灾害对内战结束的影响很少受到学者的关注。我们认为,灾难对冲突谈判的影响取决于哪个战斗人员是灾难的受害者。借鉴讨价还价模型,我们认为灾难会产生成本,从而改变叛军和政府的能力。为了让这些变化导致谈判,灾难的影响必须导致双方都预期短期内不太可能取得军事胜利。当双方都受到自然灾害的袭击时,这种相互预期很可能会形成,因为双方在短期内都面临着巨大的冲突成本。当一侧受到冲击时,未受影响的一方可能会看到与对手对抗的机会,而面临自然灾害破坏的一方可能只会看到暂时的挫折,可以从中恢复过来。这可能导致双方不更新他们对战争成本或胜利机会的看法。我们通过使用更精确的灾难位置测量方法检查 1980 年至 2005 年的所有领土内战来评估这些假设。我们发现,当双方都遭遇灾难时,谈判的可能性不断增加。当只有一侧受到影响时,对谈判的影响在模型规范中并不一致。我们通过使用更精确的灾难位置测量方法检查 1980 年至 2005 年的所有领土内战来评估这些假设。我们发现,当双方都遭遇灾难时,谈判的可能性不断增加。当只有一侧受到影响时,对谈判的影响在模型规范中并不一致。我们通过使用更精确的灾难位置测量方法检查 1980 年至 2005 年的所有领土内战来评估这些假设。我们发现,当双方都遭遇灾难时,谈判的可能性不断增加。当只有一侧受到影响时,对谈判的影响在模型规范中并不一致。

更新日期:2022-03-06
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