Social inequality takes many forms, but its most basic form is that individuals give the least and get the most in return. In this paper, we introduce an extended model based on the snowdrift game model, involving the concept of inequality (unequal distribution of benefit). We calculated the critical threshold for the benefits distribution under the dominant cooperative strategy through numerical simulation and theoretical analysis. We illustrate the similarities and differences in the evolution of cooperation with and without incentives and punishments. Both theoretical and simulation results show that within the limited resource range, the larger the resource is, the larger the critical proportion of benefits that defectors can exploit, whether in unstructured or structured population. We also show that the inequality is stronger in social structures with sparse connections and weaker in those with dense connections. Moreover, we revealed that introducing incentives and punishments makes it harder for cooperators to get a fair share of the profits.

社会不平等有多种形式，但其最基本的形式是个人付出最少，得到最多的回报。在本文中，我们介绍了一种基于雪堆博弈模型的扩展模型，其中涉及不平等（利益分配不均）的概念。我们通过数值模拟和理论分析计算了优势合作战略下利益分配的临界阈值。我们说明了在有和没有激励和惩罚的情况下合作演变的异同。理论和模拟结果都表明，在有限的资源范围内，资源越大，叛逃者可以利用的利益的关键比例越大，无论是在非结构化人口还是结构化人口中。我们还表明，在联系稀疏的社会结构中，不平等性更强，而在联系密集的社会结构中，不平等性更弱。此外，我们透露，引入激励和惩罚会使合作者更难获得公平的利润份额。