States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders’ desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

世界各国正在以前所未有的速度加强其国际边界。到第二次世界大战结束时，只有 7 个州用围墙或栅栏加固了边界，而现在这个数字已经增长到 75 个以上。为什么各州要在其国际边界上建造围墙？尽管各国可能会筑起围墙来缓解跨境经济不平等的后果并抵御跨国安全威胁，但我们认为，另一个令人信服的逻辑源于国内政治和领导人继续执政的愿望。基于转移理论提供的假设，我们认为有可能失去职位的国家政治领导人受到激励实施流行政策，例如边境墙建设，希望这样做会引发国内反弹效应。为了检验这个论点，