In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke articulates a form of scepticism about meaning. Even though there is considerable disagreement among critics about the reasoning in which the sceptic engages, there is little doubt that he seeks to offer constraints for an adequate account of the facts that constitute the meaningfulness of expressions. Many of the sceptic's remarks concern the nature of the guidance involved in a speaker's meaningful uses of expressions. I propose that we understand those remarks as seeking to give shape to the idea that to use an expression under the guidance of one's understanding is to have a reason for that use, which one's understanding allows one to discern and act on. Any philosophical elucidation of meaning must adequately capture the rational nature of our linguistic acts.

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意义、理性和指导

在维特根斯坦关于规则和私人语言的文章中，索尔·克里普克表达了一种对意义的怀疑态度。尽管批评者对怀疑论者所从事的推理存在相当大的分歧，但毫无疑问，他试图为充分说明构成表达意义的事实提供限制。怀疑论者的许多言论都与演讲者有意义地使用表达所涉及的指导性质有关。我建议我们将这些评论理解为试图塑造这样一种观念，即在一个人的理解的指导下使用一个表达就是有一个使用的理由，一个人的理解允许一个人辨别和采取行动。任何对意义的哲学阐释都必须充分抓住我们语言行为的理性本质。