Standard principles of mereology, such as the transitivity and asymmetry of proper parthood, have been questioned, using various multi-location scenarios. The most famous of these is Borges’s Aleph, although the literature is rife with other examples that allegedly show that some mereological principle is at odds with some form of multi-location. However, the scenarios only support this conclusion given various bridge principles that link location to parthood. I argue that the bridge principles that guarantee the desired conclusion are controversial partly because they give the wrong result in other situations, in particular cases of co-location. Moreover, less controversial bridge principles do not provide an incompatibility result between standard mereological principles and multi-location. Hence, multi-location does not threaten any standard mereological principles.

使用各种多位置场景，已经质疑了分体论的标准原则，例如适当部分的传递性和不对称性。其中最著名的是博尔赫斯的《阿列夫》，尽管文献中充斥着其他据称表明某些分体原理与某种形式的多地点不一致的例子。然而，鉴于将位置与部分联系起来的各种桥梁原则，这些场景仅支持这一结论。我认为，保证预期结论的桥梁原则是有争议的，部分原因是它们在其他情况下给出了错误的结果，尤其是在同一地点的情况下。此外，争议较少的桥梁原则并未提供标准分体学原则与多地点之间的不兼容结果。因此，