ABSTRACT

Given the success of the formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension to the challenge of understanding intention. According to them, (1) intentions can also admit of degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these degreed states are all governed by the norms of the probability calculus, such that the rational norms for belief and for intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises some worries about (2). It considers two schemes for representing degreed intention, and casts some doubt on applying probabilistic norms to degreed intention on each scheme. And it argues that the norms of Intention–Belief Consistency and Enkrasia cannot plausibly be turned into norms prescribing a simple correspondence relation between one’s degrees of belief and intention. The results suggest a potential structural discrepancy between the norms of theoretical and practical rationality—at least for degreed belief and intention. This potential discrepancy not only raises interesting questions about the intention–belief relation and rational norms for degreed intention. It also poses a new challenge for intention-based expressivism about normative judgment and cognitivism about practical rationality.

摘要

鉴于当代认识论中形式方法在理解程度信念方面的成功，一些哲学家最近考虑将其扩展到理解意图的挑战。根据他们的说法，（1）意图也可以像信念一样承认程度，并且（2）这些程度的状态都受到概率演算规范的控制，使得信念和意图的理性规范表现出一定的结构相似性。然而，本文对（2）提出了一些担忧。它考虑了两种表示分级意图的方案，并对将概率规范应用于每个方案的分级意图提出了一些疑问。它认为，意图-信念一致性和Enkrasia规范不能合理地转变为规定一个人的信念程度和意图之间简单对应关系的规范。结果表明，理论理性规范与实践理性规范之间存在潜在的结构性差异——至少在程度的信念和意图方面是如此。这种潜在的差异不仅引发了关于意图-信念关系和分级意图的理性规范的有趣问题。这也对基于意图的规范判断的表现主义和实践理性的认知主义提出了新的挑战。这种潜在的差异不仅引发了关于意图-信念关系和分级意图的理性规范的有趣问题。这也对基于意图的规范判断的表现主义和实践理性的认知主义提出了新的挑战。这种潜在的差异不仅引发了关于意图-信念关系和分级意图的理性规范的有趣问题。这也对基于意图的规范判断的表现主义和实践理性的认知主义提出了新的挑战。