Public service delivery by African states is often characterized as particularist, favoring ethnic, personal or political networks of those inside the state over universalist, pro-social services to citizens. One explanation for particularist service delivery focuses on societal patronage norms, with ‘Big Men’ providing for members of their networks. Despite the prominence of this line of reasoning and the anecdotal prevalence of ‘Big Men’ in politics and society, hardly any research has quantitatively assessed the effects of ‘Big Man’ governance inside the state. Through a behavioural experiment with over 1,300 Ugandan bureaucrats, our paper seeks to address this gap. In the experiment, we find that activating social status -- that is ‘big man’ status -- in bureaucrats embedded in patronage networks significantly curbs their pro-social behavior. Our paper contributes an important empirical micro-foundation to help explain one cause of limited universal service delivery by bureaucrats.

中文翻译：

---

激活“大人物”：非洲官僚机构的社会地位、赞助网络和亲社会行为

非洲国家提供的公共服务通常被描​​述为特殊主义，有利于国家内部的种族、个人或政治网络，而不是向公民提供普遍主义的、有利于社会的服务。对特殊服务交付的一种解释侧重于社会赞助规范，“大人物”为其网络成员提供服务。尽管这种推理方式的重要性以及“大人物”在政治和社会中的传闻盛行，但几乎没有任何研究定量评估“大人物”治理在国家内部的影响。通过对 1,300 多名乌干达官僚的行为实验，我们的论文试图解决这一差距。在实验中，我们发现激活社会地位——即“大人物”地位——在嵌入赞助网络的官僚中显着抑制了他们的亲社会行为。