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What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena
Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2021-11-18 , DOI: 10.1093/nc/niab027
Andrea I Luppi 1, 2, 3 , Pedro A M Mediano 4 , Fernando E Rosas 5, 6, 7 , David J Harrison 3, 8 , Robin L Carhart-Harris 5 , Daniel Bor 4 , Emmanuel A Stamatakis 1, 2
Affiliation  

A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterization of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness—viewed as integrated information—to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (ΦID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition—providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in their information-theoretic composition. Building on ΦID’s revised understanding of integrated information, termed ΦR, we also introduce the notion of ΦR-ing ratio to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of ΦR and ΦR-ing ratio may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different ‘modes of consciousness’, establishing a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, ΦID yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.

中文翻译:

有点是什么感觉:突发心理现象的综合信息分解说明

神经科学的一个核心问题是意识与其物理基础之间的关系。在这里,我们认为,通过将意识视为由不同的信息论元素构成,可以获得更丰富的意识特征。换句话说,我们提出了从意识量化(被视为综合信息)到其分解的转变。通过这种称为综合信息分解 (ΦID) 的方法,我们提出了一个正式的论点,即给定系统的意识是否是一种新兴现象,取决于它的信息理论构成——为长期以来关于意识与涌现之间的关系。此外,我们表明两种生物可能获得相同数量的综合信息,但它们的信息论构成不同。基于 ΦID 对集成信息的修订理解,称为 ΦR,我们还引入了 ΦR-ing 比率的概念,以量化实体使用信息进行有意识处理的效率。ΦR 和 ΦR-ing 比率的组合可以提供一种比较意识不同方面的神经基础的重要方法。意识的分解使我们能够识别质量上不同的“意识模式”,建立一个共同空间来绘制不同意识状态的现象学。我们概述了在现象学和信息理论模式之间进行这种映射的理论和经验途径,从日常意识的核心特征开始:自我。全面的,
更新日期:2021-11-18
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