Abstract

There are two general views that social ontologists currently defend concerning the nature of joint intentional action. According to ‘non-normativists’, for a joint action to be established, we need to align certain psychological states in certain ways. ‘Normativists’ argue that joint action essentially involves normative relations that cannot be reduced to the intentional states of individuals. In two ground-breaking publications, Javier Gomez-Lavin and Matthew Rachar empirically investigate the relation between normativity and joint action in several survey studies. They argue that people's intuitions support neither current normativists nor current non-normativists. They suggest that there is a need for a ‘new normativism of joint action’. I first explore what a new normativism could amount to and conclude that the authors’ findings cannot support a demand for such a view. Finally, I suggest some ideas about how to move the field forward.

中文翻译：

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最近关于联合行动的实验哲学：我们是否需要关于集体行动的新规范主义？

摘要

目前，社会本体论者对联合故意行为的性质有两种普遍看法。根据“非规范主义者”的说法，要建立联合行动，我们需要以某种方式调整某些心理状态。“规范主义者”认为，联合行动本质上涉及不能简化为个人的意向状态的规范关系。在两篇开创性的出版物中，Javier Gomez-Lavin 和 Matthew Rachar 在几项调查研究中对规范性与联合行动之间的关系进行了实证研究。他们认为，人们的直觉既不支持当前的规范主义者，也不支持当前的非规范主义者。他们认为需要一种“联合行动的新规范主义”。我首先探讨了一种新的规范主义可能意味着什么，并得出结论，作者的发现不能支持对这种观点的需求。最后，我提出了一些关于如何推动该领域前进的想法。