ABSTRACT

Large-scale illegal fishing commenced in Australian coastal reefs 1970. Since, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has been “out of synch” with matching its Tier 2 constabulary vessels to their mission. The pattern is that “mission goalposts” shift post-acquisition, reflecting changes to UNCLOS. Post-WWII, the RAN employed wartime escorts in patrol roles, and wartime launches for littoral constabulary. The RAN has recreated this mix in the twentyfirst century. This paper traces this process and associated problems. Minimum resources are assigned to constabulary functions in peacetime, yet the units involved are arguably the most operational and politically sensitive. Vessel unsuitability has consistently meant personnel problems, over-use of constabulary vessels, and high maintenance costs. Australia's strategic situation is deteriorating towards a point where the rising risk demands mobilisation responses. This would include rapid acquisition of large numbers of Tier 2 assets to meet existing and conflict low-mix roles.

摘要

1970 年，澳大利亚沿海珊瑚礁开始大规模非法捕捞。从那时起，澳大利亚皇家海军 (RAN) 一直“不同步”，将其 2 级警察船只与其任务相匹配。模式是“任务目标”在收购后发生变化，反映了《联合国海洋法公约》的变化。二战后，英国皇家海军使用战时护送人员担任巡逻任务，并在战时为沿海警察发射。RAN 在 21 世纪重新创造了这种组合。本文追溯了这一过程和相关问题。和平时期为警察职能分配的资源最少，但所涉及的单位可以说是最具行动性和政治敏感性的单位。船只不适合一直意味着人员问题、警察船只的过度使用和高昂的维护成本。澳大利亚' 战略形势正在恶化，风险上升需要动员应对。这将包括快速获取大量二级资产以满足现有的和冲突的低混合角色。