Majority of the minority (MOM) approval of related party transactions (RPTs) has become a popular mechanism to be used in the oversight of RPTs among academics, stakeholders and regulators. Using this mechanism means that for companies, entering into RPTs are subject to the approval of a certain majority of the disinterested shareholders. This article examines the effectiveness of MOM approval as a mechanism to oversee RPTs, i. e. whether it would prevent value-decreasing RPTs while allowing value-increasing ones, by analysing institutional shareholder voting in this context within the US and European legal framework. Specifically, it examines whether institutional shareholders who dominate the shareholding across the world have sufficient incentives to cast informed votes in MOM votes on RPTs and the role of proxy advisors in this regard. Taking account of the relevant theoretical claims and empirical evidence, it provides further policy recommendations to improve the efficacy of MOM approval.

中文翻译：

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关联交易多数同意：机构股东投票情况分析

大多数少数派 (MOM) 批准关联方交易 (RPT) 已成为学术界、利益相关者和监管机构监督 RPT 的流行机制。使用这种机制意味着公司进入 RPT 需要获得一定多数的无利害关系股东的批准。本文通过分析美国和欧洲法律框架内的机构股东投票，检验了 MOM 批准作为监督 RPT 机制的有效性，即它是否会阻止价值下降的 RPT，同时允许价值增加的 RPT。具体来说，它考察了在全球范围内占主导地位的机构股东是否有足够的动机在 MOM 对 RPT 的投票中进行知情投票，以及代理顾问在这方面的作用。