This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.

中文翻译：

---

意识的多世界理论

本文概述了一种新的、有些异端的形而上学意识理论：“多世界理论”。它放弃了所有有意识主体的体验都是同一个世界的特征的假设，而是将不同的主体与不同的“第一人称中心世界”联系起来。我们可以将这些视为共享的“第三人称世界”的不同“第一人称实现者”，后者在某种意义上是随附的，需要解释。这与一种形式的模态现实主义相结合，根据这种形式，不同主体的第一人称中心世界都是真实的，尽管每个主体只存在其中一个。该理论提供了一种新颖的方式来捕捉意识体验的不可还原的主观本质，而不会陷入唯我论。该论文还研究了一些关于意识的科学理论，