Extensive sorting of high-performing teachers into the most advantaged schools contributes to the wide socioeconomic achievement gaps in many countries. The Chilean Pedagogical Excellence Assignment (AEP) pays bonuses to high-performing teachers that are larger if they work at a disadvantaged school. Using a sharp regression discontinuity based on the program's eligibility rules, we estimate how the award affects where high-performing teachers choose to work. The bonus, equivalent to 16 percent of an average annual salary, increased retention of high-performing teachers in disadvantaged schools by 17 to 21 percentage points. In contrast, those teachers in more advantaged schools seem to use the award as a quality signal to stay or move to relatively high-achieving schools. While the program accomplished its goal of retaining high-performing teachers already working at disadvantaged schools, it did not achieve the objective of attracting better teachers from more advantaged schools.

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财政激励能否帮助弱势学校吸引和留住优秀教师？来自智利的证据

将高绩效教师广泛分类到最有优势的学校，导致许多国家的社会经济成就差距很大。智利卓越教学计划 (AEP) 向在弱势学校工作的表现出色的教师发放奖金。使用基于计划资格规则的急剧回归不连续性，我们估计该奖项如何影响高绩效教师选择工作的地方。奖金相当于平均年薪的 16%，使弱势学校的优秀教师的保留率提高了 17 至 21 个百分点。相比之下，那些在更有优势的学校里的老师似乎把这个奖项作为一个质量信号，让他们留在或搬到成绩相对较好的学校。