ABSTRACT

A true-emotion view of blameworthiness holds that one is blameworthy for an offence just in case one is a fitting target of a blaming emotion in response to that offence, and a blaming emotion is fitting just in case it truly represents things. Proportionality requires that fitting blame be of the right size, neither an overreaction nor an underreaction to the offence. Here it is argued that this requirement makes trouble for a true-emotion view. Instances of blaming emotions can differ in size, and can thus differ with respect to whether they are proportional, without differing in the representations that true-emotion theorists attribute to them. The option of attributing further representations to blaming emotions, with the aim of avoiding this objection, is considered, and shown to raise new difficulties for the view.

摘要

真实情感观点认为，如果一个人是针对该罪行的责备情绪的合适目标，那么一个人应该为犯罪而受到责备，而责备情绪是合适的，以防它真正代表事物。相称性要求适当的责备大小合适，既不能反应过度，也不能反应不足。这里有人争辩说，这一要求给真实情感观点带来了麻烦。指责情绪的实例在大小上可能不同，因此它们是否成比例也可能不同，而真实情绪理论家赋予它们的表征却没有不同。为了避免这种反对意见，将进一步的表征归因于指责情绪的选项被考虑，并表明给该观点带来了新的困难。