Since the end of the last century, there has been several ambitious attempts to naturalize Husserlian phenomenology by way of mathematization. To justify themselves in view of Husserl’s adamant antinaturalism, many of these attempts appeal to the new physico-mathematical tools that were unknown in Husserl’s time and thus allegedly make his position outdated. This paper critically addresses these mathematization proposals and aims to show that Husserl had, in fact, sufficiently good arguments that make his antinaturalistic position sound even today. The starting point of the discussion presented in this paper is the mathematization project introduced by Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud, and Francisco Varela in their introduction to the book Naturalizing Phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 1999). This proposal was followed by a number of critiques but also by several alternative naturalization attempts clearly inspired by Roy et al.’s ambitious project. The review of some of Husserl’s important arguments often overlooked or misinterpreted by both the naturalization advocates and their critics leads the author of the paper to the twofold conclusion which, on the one hand, explores the deeper reasons for the impossibility of a physical and mathematical treatment of phenomenology, on the other hand, clarifies the sense in which such treatments are possible, namely by way of restriction of the variety of experiential aspects that undergo naturalization and substitution of the aspects amenable to the direct mathematization for the directly unmathematizable ones. In the fourth section of this paper, the author attempts to demonstrate that, contrary to widespread belief, Husserl’s arguments are not obsolete by the standards of the contemporary physico-mathematical approaches employed in the mathematization of phenomenology and indeed stand the test of time.

自上世纪末以来，已经有几次雄心勃勃的尝试，通过数学化的方式将胡塞尔现象学自然化。鉴于胡塞尔顽固的反自然主义，为了证明自己的合理性，这些尝试中的许多都求助于胡塞尔时代不为人知的新物理数学工具，因此据称使他的立场过时了。这篇论文批判性地讨论了这些数学化建议，旨在表明胡塞尔实际上有足够好的论据，即使在今天也能证明他的反自然主义立场。本文讨论的起点是 Jean-Michel Roy、Jean Petitot、Bernard Pachoud 和 Francisco Varela 在他们对《自然化现象学》一书的介绍中介绍的数学化项目（斯坦福大学出版社，1999 年）。该提议之后受到了一些批评，但也受到了罗伊等人雄心勃勃的项目的明显启发。对胡塞尔的一些重要论点的回顾往往被归化倡导者和他们的批评者所忽视或误解，这使该论文的作者得出了双重结论，一方面，探讨了物理和数学处理不可能的更深层次的原因另一方面，现象学的理论阐明了这种处理是可能的意义，即通过限制经历归化的经验方面的多样性，并用直接数学化的方面代替直接无法数学化的方面。在本文的第四部分，