This study considers endogenous domestic standards on products to control negative consumption externalities using a three-country model of international oligopoly with a possible free trade agreement (FTA). The authors examine how the level of product standards and welfare are affected under an FTA and how the harmonization of standards affects the impact of the FTA. They find that if asymmetries in preferences or transboundary externalities are not too strong, an FTA makes product standards more stringent. In such a case, the FTA may or may not make the member countries better off, but it does make the non-member country better off. They also demonstrate that harmonizing the standards across the FTA members makes an FTA more favorable.

本研究考虑了产品的内生国内标准，以使用可能签订自由贸易协定 (FTA) 的国际寡头垄断三国模型来控制负消费外部性。作者研究了 FTA 下产品标准和福利水平如何受到影响，以及标准的协调如何影响 FTA 的影响。他们发现，如果偏好不对称或跨界外部性不太强，FTA 会使产品标准更加严格。在这种情况下，FTA 可能会也可能不会使成员国变得更好，但它确实使非成员国变得更好。他们还表明，在 FTA 成员之间协调标准会使 FTA 更加有利。