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The Phenomenology of Moral Intuition
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Pub Date : 2022-01-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10245-w
Robert Audi 1
Affiliation  

Moral judgment commonly depends on intuition. It is also true, though less widely agreed, that ethical theory depends on it. The nature and epistemic status of intuition have long been concerns of philosophy, and, with the increasing importance of ethical intuitionism as a major position in ethics, they are receiving much philosophical attention. There is growing agreement that intuition conceived as a kind of seeming is essential for both the justification of moral judgment and the confirmation of ethical theories. This paper describes several importantly different kinds of intuition, particularly the episodic kinds often called seemings. This is done partly by sketching numerous examples of intuition. Intuitive seemings and moral judgments based on them differ in content, basis, epistemic authority, and phenomenology. The paper explores these four dimensions of intuition and, in doing so, compares moral intuition with moral perception. The overall aim is to clarify moral phenomenology both descriptively and epistemologically and to support the view that intuitions are often discriminative responses to experience and have justificatory power analogous to the power of sense-perceptions.



中文翻译:

道德直觉的现象学

道德判断通常取决于直觉。伦理理论依赖于它也是正确的,尽管不太被广泛认同。直觉的性质和认识地位长期以来一直是哲学的关注点,随着伦理直觉主义作为伦理学主要地位的日益重要,它们也受到哲学界的广泛关注。越来越多的人一致认为,直觉被视为一种表象,对于道德判断的正当性和伦理理论的确认都是必不可少的。这篇论文描述了几种重要的不同类型的直觉,尤其是经常被称为表象的偶发直觉. 这部分是通过勾勒出许多直觉的例子来完成的。直观的表象和基于它们的道德判断在内容、基础、认识权威和现象学上各不相同。本文探讨了直觉的这四个维度,并在此过程中将道德直觉与道德知觉进行了比较。总体目标是在描述性和认识论上阐明道德现象学,并支持直觉通常是对经验的辨别性反应并且具有类似于感官知觉的力量的证明力量的观点。

更新日期:2022-01-07
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