Auction theory suggests that bidders follow a dominant strategy that is to submit the highest bid equal to the bidder's true valuation in an ascending price auction with independent and private values. Bidders in real-world auctions may deviate from this strategy, resulting in either underbidding—submitting bids lower than the valuation—or overbidding—bidding an amount in excess of the real value. This study utilises data collected from online agricultural land lease auctions in Ukraine that took place between October 2018 and September 2019 to analyse the occurrence of minimal price increases, which may indicate underbidding. It investigates if factors—auction and property characteristics—that typically explain deviations from the dominant strategy—can also explain bidding behaviours in land lease auctions. The estimation using a heteroscedastic probit model reveals that underbidding could reasonably be attributed to low competition, insufficient time to place a subsequent bid, very small bid increments, and cumbersome entry fees.

中文翻译：

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较低的价格上涨，投标人的有限理性，以及在线农业土地拍卖中的低价问题：乌克兰案例

拍卖理论表明，投标人遵循优势策略，即在具有独立和私人价值的升价拍卖中提交等于投标人真实估值的最高出价。现实世界拍卖中的投标人可能会偏离这一策略，导致出价过低（提交低于估值的出价）或出价过高（出价超过实际价值）。本研究利用从 2018 年 10 月至 2019 年 9 月期间在乌克兰进行的在线农业土地租赁拍卖收集的数据来分析可能表明出价过低的最低价格上涨的发生。它调查了通常解释偏离优势策略的因素——拍卖和财产特征——是否也可以解释土地租赁拍卖中的投标行为。