Evolutionary debunking arguments draw on claims about the biological origins of our moral beliefs to undermine moral realism. In this paper, I argue that moral disagreement gives us reason to doubt the evolutionary explanations of moral judgment on which such arguments rely. The extent of cross-cultural and historical moral diversity suggests that evolution can’t explain the content of moral norms. Nor can it explain the capacity to make moral judgment in the way the debunker requires: empirical studies of folk moral judgments show that they lack the kind of objectivity debunkers point to as an evolutionary contribution to our capacity for moral judgment. Thus, the empirical premise of debunking arguments lacks empirical support.

进化论的揭穿论据利用关于我们道德信仰的生物学起源的主张来破坏道德现实主义。在本文中，我认为道德分歧使我们有理由怀疑这些论点所依赖的道德判断的进化解释。跨文化和历史道德多样性的程度表明进化不能解释道德规范的内容。它也不能以揭穿者要求的方式来解释做出道德判断的能力：民间道德判断的实证研究表明，它们缺乏揭穿者所指的那种客观性，认为这是对我们道德判断能力的进化贡献。因此，揭穿论证的经验前提缺乏经验支持。