Does conceptual engineering as a philosophical method deserve all the attention that it has been getting recently? The important philosophical questions, one might say, are about the world, not about what our concepts are or should be like. This paper fleshes out one way in which conceptual engineering can contribute to philosophical progress. The suspicion that conceptual engineering is getting too much attention presupposes that it is important to distribute our philosophical attention well (for example, conceptual engineering should not get more than its fair share). The paper’s defense of conceptual engineering builds on that assumption. Conceptual engineering, it argues, is a way of configuring philosophers’ patterns of attention for the better: it serves attentional progress in philosophy.

中文翻译：

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概念工程的注意进展

作为一种哲学方法的概念工程是否值得它最近得到的所有关注？有人可能会说，重要的哲学问题是关于世界的，而不是关于我们的概念是什么或应该是什么样的。本文充实了概念工程有助于哲学进步的一种方式。怀疑概念工程得到太多关注的前提是，很好地分配我们的哲学注意力很重要（例如，概念工程不应得到超过其公平份额）。该论文对概念工程的辩护建立在这一假设之上。它认为，概念工程是一种更好地配置哲学家注意力模式的方法：它服务于哲学的注意力进步。