This article examines how rebels govern after winning a civil war. During war, both sides—rebels and their rivals—form ties with civilians to facilitate governance and to establish control. To consolidate power after war, the new rebel government engages in control through its ties in its wartime strongholds, through coercion in rival strongholds where rivals retain ties, and through cooptation by deploying loyal bureaucrats to oversee development in unsecured terrain where its ties are weak. These strategies help to explain subnational differences in postwar development. The author analyzes Zimbabwe's Liberation War (1972–1979) and its postwar politics (1980–1987) using a difference-in-differences identification strategy that leverages large-scale education reforms. Quantitative results show that development increased most quickly in unsecured terrain and least quickly in rival strongholds. Qualitative evidence from archival and interview data confirms the theorized logic. The findings deepen understanding of transitions from conflict to peace and offer important insights about how wartime experiences affect postwar politics.

中文翻译：

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控制、强制和合作

本文探讨了叛军在赢得内战后如何执政。在战争期间，双方——叛军及其对手——与平民建立联系以促进治理和建立控制。为了在战后巩固权力，新的反叛政府通过其战时据点的联系，通过对竞争对手保持联系的敌对据点的胁迫，以及通过部署忠诚的官僚来监督其关系薄弱的不安全地区的发展来进行控制。这些战略有助于解释战后发展中的地方差异。作者使用利用大规模教育改革的差异识别策略分析了津巴布韦的解放战争（1972-1979）及其战后政治（1980-1987）。定量结果表明，在不安全的地形中发展速度最快，而在敌对据点中发展速度最慢。来自档案和访谈数据的定性证据证实了理论化的逻辑。这些发现加深了对从冲突到和平的过渡的理解，并就战时经历如何影响战后政治提供了重要见解。